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Scott McLaren

Hermeticism and the Metaphysics of Goodness in the
Novels of Charles Williams
Scott McLaren
aMny readers have found Charles Williams's sustained use of
hermetic themes and images too great for a full acceptance of his
work. One of Williams's earliest formative encounters w ith these themes
came sometime between 1912 and 1914 when he read A.E. Waite's The
Hidden Church of the Holy Graal (1909). He was so favorably impressed by
its consideration of this Christian symbol from within the hermetic
tradition that he wrote Waite to tell him so. This initial contact led
Williams in 1917 to join Waite's ow n hermetic order The Fellowship of the
Rosy Cross. And while his reasons for ceasing to attend in 1927 and
officially withdrawing from the Fellowship in 1928 remain unknown, his
friendship with Waite continued through an amicable correspondence at
least until 1931. Waite's influence and Williams's interest in hermeticism
are, moreover, now widely acknowledged to have been lifelong
(Ashenden 52, Brewer 54, King 165, Willard 270).1
Sometime in the mid-1920s, when Williams's involvement in the
Fellowship was at its height, he began to write novels.2 The first to be
published, War in Heaven (1930), relies on Waite's hermetic study for both
the inspiration and spelling of its central image: the Holy Graal. By 1933
Williams had published four other novels that, like his first, all freely
employ themes and symbols draw n from Waite's work and from the
wider hermetic tradition. Williams's second and fourth published
novels, in particular, also have in common w ith War in Heaven narratives
that are constructed around single hermetic objects of apparent magical
power (Urang 51, 53). In Many Dimensions (1931) Williams sets before his
reader the mysterious Stone of King Solomon, an image he probably
drew from a brief description in Waite's The Holy Kabbalah (1929) of a
supernatural cubic stone on which was inscribed "the Divine Name"
(229).3 Finally, in The Greater Trumps (1932) Williams uses as his central
image the Tarot deck, a system of "high symbolism" that Waite in The
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Pictorial Key to the Tarot (1910) argues should be interpreted according to
"[...] the Laws of Grace rather than the pretexts and intuitions of that
which passes for divination" (xx).
It is generally understood that w hat Williams encountered of the
hermetic tradition through Waite had already been Christianized:
"Waite's order was mystical rather than magical; its membership was
open to those desiring 'knowledge of Divine Things and union w ith God
in Christ'" (King 165; see also Brewer 54 and Ashenden 52, 55). The
distinction between magic and mysticism, on which Williams's critics
have relied in coming to grips w ith these themes in his work, is
commented on at some length by Evelyn Underhill, a notable Christian
mystic who belonged w ith Waite to the original Order of the Golden Dawn
(Ridler xxiv, Hadfield 29) and whose letters Williams edited in 1943. She
writes:
The fundam ental difference between the two is this: magic wants to
get, mysticism wants to give [...] In mysticism the will is united with
the emotions in an impassioned desire to transcend the sense-world in
order that the self m ay be joined by love to the one eternal and
ultim ate Object of love [...] In magic, the will unites with the intellect
in an impassioned desire for supersensible knowledge. This is the
intellectual, aggressive, and scientific tem peram ent trying to extend its
field of consciousness [...] (Underhill 84; see also 178ff.)

While mysticism seeks union w ith God, Underhill frames her
concept of magic around the magician's fierce hunger for hidden
knowledge through whatever supernatural means present themselves.
King calls this magic black and writes that it "[...] is performed
perversely in order to grasp powers and to control them.
Its
consummate evil is that it violates Coinherence" (172). Underhill's
description of mysticism complements this assessment in its
foreshadowing of Williams's ow n doctrine of Coinherence: "Mysticism
[...] is non-individualistic.
It implies, indeed, the abolition of
individuality; of that hard separateness, that 'I, Me, Mine' which makes
of m an a finite isolated thing" (Underhill 85). Importantly, however, the
distinction between magic and mysticism is not everywhere unblurred.
Mysticism itself can be corrupted and "all formal religion is saturated
w ith magic" (Underhill 182). Though wholly different in their aims and
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ultimately incompatible, Underhill suggests that they seem to share a
common "starting-point" (Underhill 180).
There is an interesting passage in Williams's book Witchcraft
(1941) where he also addresses some of the same themes, though he does
so w ith explicit reference only to the w ord magic. He proposes, in
particular, two distinct psychological states that might create in someone
a predisposition towards the idea of magic. They are: (i) a perverse fear
that objects and people might transform themselves irrationally so that a
"door, untouched, might close" or more malevolently that a "hand will
become a different and terrifying thing, moving in one's own like a
malicious intruder, too real for anything but fear" (Witchcraft 77), and (ii)
a singular moment when a body becomes suddenly laden with universal
meaning: "A hand lighting a cigarette is the explanation of everything; a
foot stepping from a train is the rock of all existence" (Witchcraft 78).
Like Underhill, Williams writes that both, though wholly different, are
"[...] as valid or invalid as each other; any distinction m ust be a m atter of
choice. A nd they justify each other [because] they both at first overthrow
a simple trust that phenom ena are w hat phenom ena seem" (Witchcraft
78). In the former the observer's fear is rooted in an apprehension that
he or she m ight be threatened or harm ed by a seemingly random change;
in the latter, the observer is not harm ed but enlightened because,
Williams suggests, "the Mercy of God [...] has not left us without a cloud
of witnesses" (Witchcraft 78). The most im portant feature of these
definitions, something the former lacks completely and the latter
possesses in superabundance, is rationality.
By investing the hermetic objects in War in Heaven, Many
Dimensions, and The Greater Trumps with the qualities of both, Williams
also seems to support in these fictional narratives the notion of a
common starting-point. While these objects aid some characters in the
attainment of mystical epiphanies and union with the Divine, they are
also capable of being used selfishly to induce fear and maliciously inflict
harm on others through supernatural agency.4 This admixture of magic
and mysticism in these early novels has led some critics to advance the
notion of a somewhat inorganic "hinge" between Williams's first five and
final two novels (Ashenden 64, Medcalf 29-31). This view is based in
part on the suggestion that Williams adopted the hermetic tradition
"uncritically" in his early novels which "concern themselves [...] overtly
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w ith the practice of magic pow er" (Ashenden 64) and that only in his
later work did he modify and use "its conceptual framework to
strengthen and support traditional Christian teaching" (Ashenden 58).
This may also help to explain why Williams's later work has attracted
most of the critical attention in relation to this problem: Williams's use of
images draw n from the hermetic tradition seems less contradictory in his
later work because his understanding of that tradition as well as his skill
as a writer show evidence of having become more sophisticated and
more subtle.
The distinction between magic and mysticism can also be
expressed, however, in metaphysical terms: "[...] we are likely to fall
victims to some kind of magic the moment that the declaration 'I want to
know' ousts the declaration 'I want to be'" (Underhill 181). When asked
by Gerard Hopkins about his novels, "Do you ever wonder suddenly
w hat the whole dam n book is about?" Williams, writing to Phyllis Jones,
answered, "No [...] I always know —it's about the Holy Grail or the Stone
of Suleiman or attacks by negroes. 'Back to M atter'! is my cry, —certain
types of matter, bien entendu" (Hadfield 97). And in a later letter to Jones,
Williams writes "it is quite clear [ . ] what m atter ought to be. It ought to
be the significant presence of God" (Hadfield 107). Unlike Waite,
Williams is not attempting a prose analysis of these objects from a
Christian perspective. Instead, like Dante setting forth an image of
Christian soteriology in his beloved Beatrice (Figure of Beatrice 7),
Williams attempts to set before his readers hermetic images that are not
only metaphysically consistent with Christian theology, but serve to
illustrate the abstract principles of that theology in concrete and tangible
ways. With reference to both Dante's and Williams's use of images,
Dorothy Sayers notes that, "there is simply a showing of a picture, or the
telling of a story, in which the truth is shown in action, and the universal
structure of reality is laid bare. Because it is an image, and not an
argument, it speaks directly to the senses and the intuition of those to
w hom it is shown" (193).
In fact, an examination of Williams's use of hermetic objects from
an expressly metaphysical perspective allows for the discernment of a
less punctuated m aturation of Williams's use of those images than critics
have heretofore proposed. The metaphysical system Williams finds in
Christian theology, moreover, provides him with a methodical way of
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depicting the power of these objects as a force that is both rational and
predictable.
The objects become visible expressions of those
metaphysical principles and yield narrative images that in their turn help
characters to perceive "universal meaning in the particular" and advance
toward a direct apprehension through "the senses and the intuition" of
theological tenets that could otherwise be expressed only as abstractions.
Those characters who attem pt to turn the objects into magical tools to
achieve selfish ends simultaneously violate the principles of that
metaphysical system and consistently bring about their own downfall.
On the other hand, those who surrender to the objects "for no personal
gain, to satisfy no transcendental curiosity, to obtain no other-worldlyjoys, but purely from an instinct of love" (Underhill 85) are given
glimpses of the universe's inherent metaphysical consistency and
interconnectedness in a way that anticipates w hat Williams w ould later
define more formally as the doctrine of Coinherence.
Fear of these
objects, of the irrationality that Williams describes as potentially
terrifying and malicious, is eliminated for those who achieve this
mystical insight because they come to perceive the underlying and
inviolable metaphysical laws to which these objects so strikingly and
predictably conform (cf. Spencer 71). Williams observes the same
principle when writing about the figure of Merlin in his poem Taliessin
Through Logres: "the rod of a magician is not a toy. It is energy and
direction [...] everywhere an instrum ent of order and measurement. It
correspond[s] to the arm and to prosody, to anatomy and to law, to all
roads and rules" ("The Making of Taliessin" 182). As this paper will
attem pt to show, the "roads and rules" upon which Williams builds his
hermetic images are consistently, and in an increasingly sophisticated
way in each subsequent novel, draw n from the systematic philosophy
articulated by Platonist and Christian metaphysicians. "'G od always
geometrizes' said Plato, and the Hebrew prophets thought no less" (He
Came Down 34).
Before exploring the novels themselves it will be helpful to
briefly review the development of m etaphysics—the study of the nature
of being itself—from within the Christian tradition.
For many, St.
Augustine's formulation of evil as a privation of good marks the
beginning of a specifically Christian approach to metaphysics.
Augustine writes as a reformed Manichaean. The central doctrine of
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M anichaeanism rests on a cosmological dualism: evil and good operate
as equally potent forces and the universe serves as a backdrop for the
great battle between them. Manichaean belief also holds that evil
manifests itself as m atter so that the chief desire of its followers is to free
themselves from the prison of the body. Augustine's rejection of this
dualism flows primarily from his belief in an om nipotent and benevolent
Creator. Augustine's theodicy, moreover, relies heavily on the Platonic
doctrine that all being emanates from idealized Forms. Plato explains
this doctrine in The Republic by arguing that the highest Form, w hat he
calls the Form of the Good, occupies the center of reality and that all
things are dependant on that one Form for their being. Inasmuch as they
all derive their being and emanate from that one Form, they are also
good through their participation in that Form's inherent goodness
(Republic 508e). In place of the Form of the Good, Augustine substitutes
the Christian God, writing that all things "are because they come from
you" (Confessions vii.12.17). Since all things come from God, and since
evil cannot emanate from a being like the Form of the Good or God, evil
cannot then be regarded as an entity or a substance in its ow n right.
Augustine describes evil, therefore, as the derogation or corruption of an
existing being that, inasmuch as it m ust flow from God, is otherwise
good. Consequently, "all things that are corrupted suffer privation of
some good" (vii.12.18). Absolute corruption, a complete overthrow by
evil, Augustine characterizes thus: "If [beings] were to be deprived of all
good, they w ould not exist at all" (vii.12.18).
Augustine's formulation of evil as privation implies an
im portant corollary: that there is a relationship, if not an equivalency,
between being itself and goodness. This implication is not fully
articulated in the Christian tradition until Boethius's treatise De
Hebdomadibus appears about a hundred years later.5 Boethius writes,
"[...] because he who willed those things to be good was good, they are
good in virtue of the fact that they have being" (De Hebdomadibus I.155,
trans. MacDonald 303). Boethius's work is the focus of a major and
im portant mediaeval commentary tradition on this topic. Using a few
key biblical texts (cf. Gn 1.31, Tm 4.4) Aquinas and others incorporate
this thesis into their ow n more exhaustive theologies. Chesterton
provides a succinct summ ary in his biography Thomas Aquinas:
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That "God looked on all things and saw that they were good" [Gn
1.31] contains a subtlety which the popular pessimist cannot follow; or
is too hasty to notice. It is the thesis that there are no bad things; but
only bad uses of things [...] But it is possible to have bad intentions
about good things; and good things, like the world and the flesh, have
been twisted by a bad intention called the devil. But he cannot make
things bad; they remain as on the first day of creation. The work of
heaven alone was material; the making of a material world. The work
of hell is entirely spiritual. (Chesterton 125)
It m ust be adm itted that Williams may have assented to these
principles as dogm a rather than self-evident and compelling truths. C.S.
Lewis observes that "[Williams] m aintained that the prayer in which we
give thanks 'for our creation' could be joined in only by an act of wholly
supernatural faith. 'Thanks!' he w ould say, and then followed an
eloquent pause. He was ready to accept as a revealed doctrine the
proposition that existence is good: but added that it w ould never have
occurred to him, unaided, to suspect this" (xii). In spite of this caution,
Williams's awareness of the larger theological background (cf. Scheper
135-6), and his assent to "the good of mere being in itself" (Witchcraft
155), is nothing short of engulfing in its ubiquity throughout his fiction
and especially those parts of it infused with a supernatural dimension.
In the Christian tradition these metaphysical principles are most visible
in the doctrines of the Creation, its derogation in the Fall, as well as its
eventual affirmation in the Incarnation.
These same themes are
commented on and recur continually throughout the corpus of
Williams's ow n work including War in Heaven, Many Dimensions, and The
Greater Trumps. A brief consideration of Williams's ow n particular
theology around these themes will help further our understanding of the
way in which he incorporates them into his novels.
Williams writes that God's words to Moses constitute "the first
grand metaphysical phrase: the 'I am that I am' [Ex 3.14]. [...] God is no
longer only creative but self-existent. It is this utter self-existence the
sound of which is prolonged now through the whole book; 'I am the
Lord' rings everywhere like the refrain of the heavens" (He Came Down
27).6 Like Augustine, Williams's theodicy is founded on the "utter self
existence" and goodness of God and his creation. He quotes Aquinas
who in turn quotes Augustine, "[...] since evil is not of itself knowable,
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forasmuch as 'evil is the privation of good', as Augustine says (Confess.
iii, 7), therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good"
(He Came Down 20). Adam and Eve are left as good creatures w ithin a
good universe. Because this universe is absolutely preclusive of evil as a
substance in its ow n right, Williams argues that Adam and Eve can fall
only by assuming a stance of opposition to the good: "They knew good;
they wished to know good and evil. Since there was n o t—since there
never has been and never will be —anything else than the good to know,
they knew good as antagonism" (He Came Down 21). He elaborates the
concept in metaphysical terms by writing that the slow erosion of good
in Adam and Eve tends not merely to corruption, but also to "the slow
destruction of the good, and of themselves w ith the good" (He Came
Down 20). In this way Williams depicts the Fall as a derogation of being.
Its ultimate result is an engulfing nihilism where "life is no good and
death is no good, and the most fortunate are those who have not been"
(He Came Down 44). As Augustine writes, once creatures are fully
deprived of good, "they [cease to] exist at all" (Confessions vii.12.18).
Williams elsewhere discusses Satan's fall in terms that are
compatible w ith Augustine's doctrine of evil as privation. Like humans,
Satan too m ust know evil as opposition to good and, more directly, as
opposition to God. In Paradise Lost, after being overwhelmed by God,
Satan cries out "Evil, be thou my Good" (iv.110); Williams adds, "his
defeat shall be his life. If he m ust know himself so, he will 'enjoy' that
sole m ethod of knowing himself" (English Poetic Mind 146). Like
humans, Satan will continue to exist in his fallen state: "He cannot get
rid of the good, he cannot destroy it. He can only know, and refuse, and
hate it, and be equivalent to it. So Satan accepts the contradiction within
him, with no hope of its resolution and no fear of its agony" (English
Poetic Mind 123-124).
In his book length study Witchcraft Williams quotes a lengthy
passage from the Malleus Maleficarum that outlines Satan's motives in
terms that are expressly linked to Plato's notion that goodness and being
emanate from God as the single "self-existing" centre of all:
It was not that the Devil wished generally to be equal with God. He
desired it in a particular way. 'He wished and asked that the
blessedness and goodness of all the inferior creatures should be
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derived from him. And he sought this in his own natural capacity,
that just as he was the first to be endowed in nature with those
qualities, so the other creatures should receive them from the nobility
of his nature. And he sought this of God, in perfect willingness to
remain subject to God so long as he had that power granted to him.'
This, and only this, was his error and his sin; he desired to be, to those
related to him by a certain dependence, the only source of good.
(Witchcraft 126)

This image seems to have resonated w ith Williams: two years
later, in 1943, he quotes from this passage again in a book review and
adds the gloss, "From some such wish all evils rose, and rise" ("Image of
Man" 145). Unlike Milton's Satan, the Malleus does not describe an
attem pt to overthrow God directly, but to usurp his place as the source
and centre of being and goodness for all other created things, to become
a divine surrogate by functioning as Plato's Form of the Good. It is an
image not of moral impropriety but of an unjustifiable metaphysical
arrogation of the universe.7
Turning to a consideration of the hermetic objects at the centre of
Williams's earlier novels, one can observe in them an elaboration of these
metaphysical principles. Though sometimes used as tools to achieve
selfish ends, the objects themselves remain inherently good in keeping
w ith the metaphysic that Satan "cannot make things bad [so] they
remain as on the first day of creation" (Chesterton 125). Williams
constructs the plot of his first published novel, War in Heaven (WH),
around an object he elsewhere describes as an image that "No invention
can come near [...] no fabulous imagination excel" ("The Figure of
A rthur" 13): the Holy Graal. It is generally understood that Williams
drew on Waite's study for his initial inspiration. Indeed, he readily
acknowledged that the Graal likely had many hermetic antecedents in
the form of "[...] cauldrons of plenty and vessels of magic" ("The Figure
of Arthur" 13, 23). But the "point is not where [it] came from" ("Malory
on the Grail Legend" 187) but what Williams does with it in his narrative
as an image of the "roads and rules" of Christian metaphysics.
The potency of the Graal is traditionally understood to flow from
its unique provenance as the cup used by Christ at the Last Supper.
Provenance as a theme in its own right appears not only in the m yth of
the Graal, but is also deeply em bedded in the wider Christian tradition.
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That objects can become supernaturally efficacious as a result of contact
w ith holy people or sacred events is consistently advanced from the Acts
of the Apostles (cf. Acts 19.11-12) to Aquinas (iii.38.6). Williams takes this
a step further by intimately connecting the Graal's provenance to the
Platonic doctrine of emanation; it is, in fact, only in the twining of the
two that the ultimate explanation of its power emerges.
Shortly after the novel opens we learn that a cynical scholar
named Sir Giles Tumulty has deduced that the Holy Graal is among the
property of a small and obscure parish church in Fardles. The church's
vicar, a diminutive Archdeacon reminiscent of Chesterton's Father
Brown, nevertheless believes that the chalice is nothing out of the
ordinary. In spite of the Archdeacon's skepticism, however, Tumulty's
deduction does not fail to ignite the acquisitive interest of Gregory
Persimmons, an antiquarian and collector of esoteric rarities. Unlike
m any collectors, Persimmons revels not in the chase, but in the
metaphysic of having and holding precious objects. N ot surprisingly
Persimmons attempts to purchase and, when that fails, to steal the Graal.
The Archdeacon, though seemingly detached even w hen he becomes
convinced of the Graal's authenticity, nevertheless does share
Persimmons's fascination with objects and with their provenance. While
visiting Persimmons at his home, for example, the Archdeacon becomes
fascinated by a copy of King Lear that seems to have been owned by
both Shakespeare and Milton:
The Archdeacon took it carefully. It was a copy of the old pre
Shakespearean King Leir, stained and frayed. But on the front was
scrawled towards the top and just against the title the two letters
"W.S." and just under them in a precise careful hand "J.M."
"Good heavens!" the Archdeacon exclaimed. "Do you m ean—?"
"Ah, that's the point," Gregory said. "Is it or isn't it? There's very
little doubt of the J.M. I've compared it with the King's College MS.,
and it's exact. But the W.S. is another matter. One daren't believe it!
Alone—perhaps, but both together! And yet, w hy not? After all, it's
very likely Shakespeare didn't take all his books back to Stratford,
especially when he's w ritten a better play himself. And he may have
known Milton the scrivener. We don't know." (WH 86)
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This dialogue exemplifies the importance of provenance in the novel:
the book's real value flows entirely from the fact that both Shakespeare
and M ilton owned it. Similarly, A rthurian m yth holds that the Graal is
remarkable among all other chalices because of its unique provenance.
Following this tradition, Williams initially offers this as the sole reason
for Persimmons's passionate desire to acquire the Graal. In an attempt to
purchase it from the Archdeacon, Persimmons feigns interest on behalf
of a friend who he claims "hates new furniture for an altar. He has some
kind of theory about stored power and concentrated sanctity which I, not
being a theologian, don't profess to understand. But the result of it is
that he infinitely prefers things that have been used for m any years in the
past" (WH 44). Not mere age, but the attribute of "use" that usually
accompanies age, is the cause of this "stored power." Williams, however,
soon abandons simple provenance as the solitary explanation of the
Graal's appeal.
In a m uch franker conversation with Tumulty,
Persimmons explains that the true reason he wants to acquire the Graal
is because "it's been as near the other centre as anything in this w orld can
get [...] It's close to the place where all things meet [...]" (WH 89-90).
Though Persimmons might be in some respects an unreliable witness, it
is clear that his metaphysical orientation is not wholly disordered
because, like the Archdeacon, he has a special appreciation for matter
and provenance that his evil cohorts Dmitri and M anasseh simply do
not. It seems clear, moreover, that in this particular passage Persimmons
is speaking in confidence and describing what he actually believes to be
the ultimate truth of the Graal. His descriptive use of the w ord "centre"
signifies that the Graal shares an im portant metaphysical characteristic
w ith Plato's Form of the Good. In fact, as the narrative progresses,
Williams's narrator relies increasingly on the language of Platonic
emanation to flesh out the Graal's ontological character and its
relationship to the rest of creation.
After Persimmons finally steals the Graal, the Archdeacon
ruminates that "Of all material things still discoverable in the w orld the
Graal had been nearest to the Divine and Universal Heart. Sky and sea
and land were moving, not towards that vessel, but towards all it
symbolized and had held [and] opened upon the Centre of all. And
through that gate, upon those tides of retirement, creation moved [...] so
and not otherwise all things return to God" (WH 137). Being at the
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"Centre of all" and somehow the thing, or even the unique symbol of the
thing, through which "creation moves" shifts the Graal's traditional
association away from the Crucifixion and toward the Creation. Like
Plato's Form of the Good and Augustine's creator God, it is at the "Centre
of all." Prester John, a mysterious figure who identifies himself as both
"the Graal and the Keeper of the Graal" (WH 189), uses similar language
to describe himself: "[...] I am the precursor of the things that are to be. I
am John and I am Galahad and I am Mary; I am the Bearer of the Holy
One [...] All magic and all holiness is through me, and though men stole
the Graal from me ages since I have been with it forever" (WH 204). His
role, as the "precursor of things that are to be" is fundamentally
metaphysical and his use of the words magic and holiness together
suggest that they perhaps share some common "starting-point"
(Underhill 180).8
After the Graal is rescued from Persimmons and his diabolical
cohorts, Prester John uses it to say Mass that, significantly, takes place
around the biblical creation narrative: "And God said: Let us make man,
in O ur image, after our likeness ... in the image of God created He him,
male and female created He them" (WH 253, 255). As the liturgy unfolds
the very being of Prester John seems to engulf those around him: "All
sound ceased; all things entered into an intense suspension of being;
nothing was anywhere at all but He" (WH 254; cf. Descent of the Dove 58).
This conflation of being, united with the Graal and juxtaposed to the
creation m yth in the Mass, carries some of the novel's strongest
overtones of Platonic emanation. As a single image Prester John and the
Graal displace all lesser images and function in the role of the one from
w hom "the blessedness and goodness of all inferior creatures should
[derive]" (Witchcraft 126) declaring "I am the prophecy of the things that
are to be and are [...] behold through me that which you seek, receive
from me that which you are" (WH 245-6). At the liturgy's conclusion the
Graal, Prester John, and the Archdeacon vanish in a final metaphysical
apotheosis (WH 255-6).9
Many images in this scene combine to create an evocative picture
of Christian metaphysical abstractions. The liturgy, as narrative context,
is itself a form of "road and rule" that points, through its use of the
Creation text, toward the goodness of "mere being in itself."10 Williams,
moreover, anticipates his later doctrine of Coinherence in the Duke who
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"[sees] certain of the faces which he knew in the great gallery of his
ancestors in the Castle, and other faces more antique and foreign than
these" (WH 252). As Williams writes himself m any years later "The
sacrifice was offered not only on earth but in the heights of the heavens
[...] The Church gave itself, and Christ gave Himself, and the two were
united" ("The Figure of A rthur" 14). In this way, the Graal serves as a
link and central image of the Coinherence of both heaven and earth. In
its conflation of being it is, along with Prester John who is priest, king,
vicar, John, Mary and Galahad (WH 156, 204), an "explanation of
everything" (Witchcraft 78; see also "The Figure of A rthur" 23). And,
importantly, though the events and voices are "awful" (WH 253), fear is
wholly absent from the experience of all present.
Williams constructs the narrative of his next novel, Many
Dimensions (MD), around the mysterious Stone of King Solomon (or
Suleiman). Verlyn Flieger writes that "Unlike the Grail [...] which [has] a
known history and a context before and beyond his novels, the Stone of
Suleiman is not an artifact immediately recognizable to most readers.
Thus, not constrained by any known properties of the Stone, Williams is
[...] freer to select his own rationale, his ow n consistent working
principle" (79). Although it might be taken as a sign of Williams's
growing confidence as a writer that the object he builds this narrative
around is one not usually associated with the Christian tradition, there is
evidence to suggest that he did not exercise quite so unfettered a
freedom as Flieger proposes in its broad depiction or in constructing a
"consistent working principle" to govern its behavior. In 1929, the same
year that Williams began to write Many Dimensions (Hadfield 93), Waite
published his study The Holy Kabbalah in which he summarizes a Zoharic
text that describes a mysterious stone called Schethlya:
cast by [God] into the abyss, so to form the basis of the world and give
birth thereto. [...] it was like a cubical stone or altar, for its extremity
was concealed in the depth, while its surface or summit rose above the
chaos. It was the central point in the immensity of the world, the
corner-stone, the tried stone, the sure foundation, but also the stone
which the builders rejected [...] It is like the lapis exilis of the German
Graal legend, and of Alchemy according to the Second Raym und
Lully, for it appears to be a slight stone; it is supposed to have been
carried by Aaron when he entered the Holy Place, and it was held in
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the hands of David when he desired to contemplate close at hand the
glory of his Master. In a sense it fell from heaven, like the stone from
the crown of Lucifer, and again it was overturned by the iniquity of
man, until Jacob restored it to an upright position. Solomon was also
one of those who restored it, and thereon he built the Sanctuary [...]
the Zoharic m yth of creation resides in the fact that this stone was
inscribed w ith the Divine Name before it was cast into the abyss."
(Holy Kabbalah 228-9)

The major mythological elements of the Stone as it appears in
Williams's novel are present in this excerpt though Williams provides his
reader with a lengthier provenance. Like Waite's Stone, Williams's is also
cubic, small enough to carry, m arked or im bued w ith the Divine Name
or Tetragrammaton, and the thing from which "the universes arose and
had being" (MD 44). And, although the Stone's "consistent working
principle" may have been, as Flieger suggests, of Williams's own
choosing, it does not seem to have been of his ow n making. As an image
it serves the same purpose as the Graal: to illustrate a progressively
w ider set of Christian metaphysical abstractions in a way that "speaks
directly to the senses and the intuition of those to whom it is shown"
(Sayers 193; cf. Shideler 19).
The Stone, like the Graal, is also discovered by the archaeologist
Sir Giles Tumulty. After completing a somewhat suspect purchase of the
artifact in Baghdad, Tumulty returns to England w ith his prize. The
novel opens on a discussion about the Stone between Tumulty, his
nephew Reginald M ontague, and the Persian Prince Ali Mirza Khan.
The Prince makes several attempts to convince Tumulty to return the
Stone to its Islamic guardians only to be refused on the grounds that
Tumulty wants to "experiment a bit" (MD 10). Throughout the course of
the novel these experiments range from the invasive to the sadistic as
Tumulty attempts to sate his "intellectual, aggressive, and scientific
tem peram ent" (Underhill 84) by testing the Stone's power over space
(MD 20-1), time (MD 87), and life and death (MD 191). Reginald
Montague, less imaginatively and perhaps less culpably, hopes to exploit
the Stone's power to make money.
After the Prince returns to the Embassy, M ontague and Tumulty
agree to involve M ontague's uncle Christopher Arglay, the Lord Chief
Justice of England, both as a potential source of capital and as surety in
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the event the Persian government attempts to repatriate the Stone
through the channels of international law. In order to be sure of the
Stone's power before proceeding, however, Tumulty undertakes an initial
experiment whereby Montague, as hum an subject, is transported
instantaneously through space (MD 20-1).
Later that same evening Tumulty, M ontague, Arglay, and
Arglay's personal secretary Chloe Burnett, convene around the Stone.
Much to the Arglay's and Chloe's amazement the Stone inexplicably
transports both M ontague to Arglay's home and back (MD 27) and
Arglay to Chloe's sitting-room and back (MD 30-1). Chloe finds the
demonstration overwhelming and excuses herself before Tumulty can
undertake his next experiment: an attempt to chip from the Stone a
small fragment to determine if its magical properties will also inhere in
the resulting piece. Tumulty is driven on by his aggressive intellect,
M ontague by the thought of "what any m an w ith money w ould give to
have a thing like that" (MD 22). But as M ontague "struck the chisel with
the hammer, [he] almost fell forward on to the table. For, unexpectedly,
since the Stone had been hard enough to the touch, it yielded
instantaneously to the blow, and, as [he] straightened himself w ith an
oath, they saw, lying on the table by the side of the Crown, a second
Stone apparently the same in all respects as the first" (MD 33-4). It is
easy to underestim ate the metaphysical significance of the fact that the
Stone can perpetuate itself without diminishing the original: "[t]he
division is accomplished yet the Stone is unchanged, and the virtues are
neither here nor there but allwhere" (MD 33). In this the Stone appears
to be, like the Form of the Good, a mysteriously inexhaustible wellspring
of being.
Although Arglay continues to seek a scientific explanation, when
Chloe learns the next day that the Stone can "m ultiply itself" in this
fashion she becomes upset and refers to it as both "magical" and
"unnatural" (MD 38). This multiplication, prima facie, overthrows
Chloe's belief that "phenom ena are w hat phenom ena seem" (Witchcraft
78) in a way "too real for anything but fear" (Witchcraft 77). As time
passes, however, Chloe comes to understand that the Stone's power is
governed by rational "roads and rules" that are consistent with its
metaphysical nature and inviolable unity, even in division. Indeed, its
Islamic guardians refer to the Stone as "the Unity" (MD 63, 198) and
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argue that its division is an offence against God himself. After its initial
division the second Stone is referred to as a replica (MD 34) and then a
copy (MD 35). Eventually, however, these terms are abandoned in favor
of the w ord "Type" because it seems to suggest a tighter ontological
bond, even a continued unity. Arglay first hears the word "Type" used
in reference to the Stone by Hajji Ibrahim, a m an w ith an acknowledged
insight into the mythology and metaphysical power of the Stone (MD
44). Arglay adopts the term himself explaining, "I say Type because the
Stones which exist—and there are several—are apparently derivations
from one Original" (MD 95). In both philosophy and Islamic thought
this radical unity is a characteristic attributed particularly to God
(Qur'an 112.1; Aristotle, Metaphysics XIL8.1f.).11 Indeed, in addition to
"the Unity" the Stone is also called the "First Matter [...] from which all
things are m ade—spirits and material things" (MD 56). Its central role in
the creation of the universe is further elaborated in the declaration that
as "the Divine One whom the Jews call Shekinah [...] gazed upon it the
universe arose and had being" (MD 44). Although the barest elements of
this m yth are present in Waite's own description, Williams amplifies this
attribute by laying heavy emphasis on the procreative power of the Stone
as the object from which all created being, like Plato's Form of the Good,
emanates. Although Williams refuses an equivalency between God and
the Stone by calling Chloe's prayer to it idolatry (MD 78-9), the Stone
does function as a "unique symbol" or image of God's ow n unity, His
"utter self-existence," and the goodness "of mere being in itself"
(Witchcraft 155). Williams's phrase "This also is Thou, Neither is this
Thou" applies here (cf. Descent of the Dove 3). Like Beatrice in the Divine
Comedy, the Stone is a potent image of things beyond it, "an image of
nobility, of virtue, of the Redeemed Life, and in some sense of Almighty
God himself" (Figure of Beatrice 8).
When Chloe asks whether the letters of the Tetragrammaton are
"real," Arglay replies that they are "real in another m anner—more or
less real than we are" (M D 38-9). Arglay quickly admits, however, that
he cannot understand how there can be "degrees in Reality" (M D 39).
St. Augustine, in w hat has been subsequently described as
"soteriological metaphysics" (Zum Brunn vii), characterizes the
movement toward God in Christ as an increase in being or magis esse,
and the movement away from God in sin as a lessening of being or minus
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esse.12 Depending on one's position along this continuum relative to God,
one can therefore exist to a greater or lesser extent—since, according to
both Plato and Augustine, all existence is derived through a greater or
lesser participation in God's ow n being along this continuum. The
assertion that the “Way to the Stone is in the Stone" (MD 198), like the
phrase “the world is in the Grail" (“Malory and the Grail Legend" 192)
rem ind the reader that these objects exist as close to God along this
continuum, this “dialectic of magis esse and minus esse" (Zum Brunn 50),
as is metaphysically possible.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the image of Iblis or
Satan. Williams expands Waite's brief and ambiguous sentence “In a
sense it fell from heaven, like the stone from the crown of Lucifer" to
write that Iblis possessed the Stone and that significantly “his fall was
not assured until that Stone dropped from his head" (MD 44). In light of
the Stone's metaphysical completeness and its association w ith the rise of
the universe, this image depicts not only a moral falling, but also a
derogation of Iblis's being. The loss of the Stone as a prerequisite for
Iblis's fall is consonant w ith the Malleus's description of God's refusal to
allow Satan to serve as the centre and source of all other created beings.
N ot only is Iblis's loss of the Stone symbolic of God's refusal to allow him
metaphysical ascendancy relative to other created beings, Williams's
direct assertion (something only implied by Waite) that A dam retained
the Stone even after the Fall suggests that humans, relative to Iblis, are
perm itted a closer participation in God's ow n being and goodness. Iblis's
loss of the Stone, therefore, diminishes him to a mere shadow of
existence further away from God and closer to the minus esse of the
continuum than any hum an being (cf. Witchcraft 36-7). By contrast
Tumulty, even after he is apparently destroyed by the Stone, seems to
continue to know that Stone is all around him, though indescribably
remote (M D 245-6). This is an apt description of hell as privation, a
steady movement along Augustine's minus esse continuum without
reaching the final and absolute abyss of annihilation. In fact, Williams's
later hint that Tumulty is never quite beyond the hope of redem ption is
predicated on his continued existence, however greatly that existence
may be diminished at any particular chronological point (see M D 259).13
A final w ord should be said about the fact that Stone is
repeatedly referred to by its keepers as the “End of Desire" (MD 43, 78,
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95, 198, &c.). Interestingly, Williams uses similar language in his
previous novel w hen describing Prester John and the Graal as "[...] the
desire of all men" (WH 251). There are a num ber of ways to understand
this phrase. Tumulty, for example, makes an attempt to convince Chloe
that "The end of desire [is] to get what you want" (MD 198). Though
there is a sense in which this is certainly true, there is also a wider
philosophical tradition behind the phrase "End of Desire" that is
specifically informed by metaphysics. Aristotle argues that "good is
w hat all things desire" (Ethics i.1.1094a3). Aquinas elaborates on this
principle, writing that "The goodness of a thing consists in its being
desirable; [...] Now clearly desirability is consequent upon perfection,
for things always desire their perfection. And the perfection of a thing
depends on how far it has achieved actuality: It is clear then that a thing
is good inasmuch as it exists [...]" (Aquinas Ia.5.1b, MacDonald 19).
Aquinas argues that all things have an intended function—and in order
to achieve that function perfectly (or completely), a thing m ust first exist.
If existence is part of that perfection or completeness, and that perfection
or desire is good, then being m ust be a part of that goodness. Set within
this context, the Stone's ability to heal people of illness seems only a
natural outflow of its metaphysical properties as the "End of Desire."
The elderly Mrs. Ferguson's exclamation, "I felt the strength just pouring
into me from that stone [...]" (MD 104) and then her sister's avowal,
"Auntie's asthma's gone. It went in the m iddle of a cough" (MD 108) are
manifestations of the Stone aiding them not only in moving along the
continuum of being, but also in realizing their ultimate end: wholeness
and happiness in the plenitude of God's own utter self-existence who "is
the perfect satisfaction of desire" (He Came Down 55).
At the end of the novel Chloe receives through the Stone a
vision that she, unlike Tumulty, seeks "for no personal gain, to satisfy no
transcendental curiosity, [...] but purely from an instinct of love"
(Underhill 85): "Vague in image, but intense in appeal, her heart
gathered all—from herself to Giles Tum ulty—in a sudden presentation
of them to the Mystery w ith which they had trafficked" (MD 259). In the
same way that the being of Prester John and the Graal conflate into a
single and shared existence, Chloe appears briefly to be not only the
servant of the Stone, but, w ith the letters of the Tetragrammaton shining
on her forehead, a very part of it (MD 262). This leads to an awareness
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on her part of a shared being, a Coinherence, with the whole created
universe and w ith God, the "Centre of all." Unlike earlier in the book,
she can no longer say that "Nothing justifie[s] her existence" (MD 50). In
this culmination Williams presents us w ith another image of the
universal manifesting itself in the particular. The Stone not only
"justifies her existence," but clothes her and everything around her in
meaning: "No violent outbreak or dazzling splendour was there; a
perfection of existence flowed from her and passed outw ard so that
[Arglay] seemed both to stand in it and to look on it w ith his natural
eyes" (MD 262).
While much of the significance of the Graal and the Stone derive
from their place "at the centre" and their association with the rise of the
spiritual and material universe, Williams reserves his most potent image
of Platonic emanation for the dancing golden figures and the original
Tarot deck in The Greater Trumps (GT). And although he again turns to
Waite's work as a source of inspiration for the novel's central image, the
Tarot, he departs here further from Waite's text than in any previous
novel. His metaphysical elaborations on the Greater Trumps, especially
the Fool and the Juggler, are especially significant of his growing
sophistication as a writer.
Much of the novel's action revolves around the love affair of a
gypsy nam ed Henry and a young wom an nam ed Nancy. Nancy lives
w ith her father Lothair Coningsby, her brother Ralph, and her unm arried
Aunt Sybil. Lothair has recently inherited a very unusual deck of Tarot
cards which Henry identifies as "the root and origin of all cards" (GT 44),
the very "originals" (GT 26). In an attem pt to wrest them from his
potential father-in-law's control, Henry enlists the help of his grandfather
Aaron Lee. In a locked room in his country house Aaron keeps a table
that is covered by an intricately m arked golden plate upon which were
"a num ber of little figures, each about three inches high, also of gold, it
seemed, very wonderfully w rought [...] there were m any of them, and
they were all in movement [...] as if of their own volition" (GT 28).
Henry and Aaron both believe that the moving or dancing figures are
closely related to the Tarot cards and that they can be used together to
plum b the deepest mysteries of the cosmos, to acquire "knowledge of the
dance" (GT 89) and thereby "extend [their] field of consciousness"
(Underhill 84). In an effort to acquire the cards from Lothair, Henry and
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Aaron invite the Coningsbys to visit Aaron's house for a few days over
Christmas. Henry hopes that his future father-in-law might part with
the cards if he can be convinced that they are m odeled on his
grandfather's figures and that, echoing the metaphysic Williams builds
in his previous novel around the Stone, to keep them apart is to "keep in
being the division of unity" (GT 89). To this end, shortly after the visitors
arrive Henry tours them through the locked room and describes the
amazing figures. He explains that they "move in order [...] all but one:
the one [figure of the Fool] in the centre. You may recognize them; the
figures are those painted on the Tarot cards [...]" (GT 73). Lothair,
however, remains stubbornly unconvinced.
Williams frames the Platonic correspondence between the
dancing figures and the w ider w orld so tightly that Henry's explanation
of the relationship between the two seems to skirt determinism: "If you
cry, it's because the m easure will have it so; if you laugh, it's because
some gayer step dem ands it, not because you will. If you ache, the dance
strains you; if you are healthy, the dance carries you" (GT 95).
Nevertheless, while always stressing order and rationality, Williams does
manage to strike a fine balance between "let[ting] yourself do what [the
cards] mean" (GT 22) and admitting that the cards are "modified [...] by
the nature of the hands between which they are held" (GT 97). Indeed,
Henry asserts his ow n will over the cards to the extent that he is able to
use them, against their nature, to raise a storm in the hope of killing
Lothair (GT 89).
In spite of Henry's attem pt to use the cards as magical tools to
"get what he wants," the cards themselves rem ain a rational image of
Platonic emanation and therefore inherently good in themselves.14 Sybil
intuitively understands the natural goodness of the symbolic
correspondence Henry describes, grasping it in terms strongly
reminiscent of Platonic emanation and also in a way that ties a perfectly
balanced correspondence between opposites within the cosmos back to
the Creation. Sybil perceives herself as:
part of an existence in which one beauty was always providing a
reason and a place for an entirely opposite beauty. As society for
solitude, and walking for sitting down, and one dress for another, and
emotions for intellect, and snowstorms for hot drinks [...] and even
one movement for another, so highly complex was the admirable
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order of the created universe. It was all rather like Henry's charming
little figures in their perpetual dance; perhaps they were a symbol of it
[...] (GT 134)

That all these things, each in its ow n place, can be described as
"beautiful" subtly points toward both Williams's doctrine of Coinherence
and the "goodness of mere being in itself."
Like the Stone and the Graal, the figures and the cards possess
unique metaphysical power. Nancy begins to suspect this after she uses
the Deniers suit of the Tarots, with Henry, to create earth (GT 47-8). "It's
m ore than fortune-telling, isn't it? Why do the cards m ake earth?" (GT
94).
Henry, hinting at a hierarchy of being m odeled on Platonic
emanation, suggests they have this power because "These cards are in
touch with a thing [for which] there aren't any words [ . ] w ith the Dance
[...] that is . . . everything" (GT 50-51). The creation of earth using the
Deniers is not "merely petty magic" (Peckham 241), but a potent
metaphysic: it is the procreative power of God to draw m atter out of
nothingness, to create ex nihilo; it is the very apogee of divine power.
Two of the Greater Trumps stand out among the rest: The Fool,
already described as being "at the centre," and the Juggler. Of these two,
the Fool is certainly the m ost mysterious. His num ber in the Tarot deck
is nought or zero. Given the larger metaphysical tradition that Williams
seems so consistently and consciously to work within, this seems prima
facie to suggest that the Fool may be a diabolical figure—one who, like
Iblis, has been pushed to the utter extremity of minus esse along the
continuum of being. The Fool's relation to the rest of the cards is equally
unclear. This is im portant because, as Henry explains (GT 44) and Sybil
later intuits (GT 134), it is only through relation and context that truth
and m eaning are possible. Indeed, the uncertainty is heightened by
Sybil's observation that: "[The Fool] m ight come anywhere. N ought isn't
a num ber at all. It's the opposite of num ber" (GT 17); further on even
Aaron admits "There are no writings which tell us anything at all of the
Fool" (GT 30). As the novel unfolds, however, the designation nought
seems less to indicate a lack of being than an utter transcendence in
being, a dichotomy between created being and creating Being: "[It is]
that which has no num ber and is called the Fool, because m ankind finds
it folly till it is known. It is sovereign or it is nothing, and if it is nothing
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then m an was born dead" (GT 196; cf. King 175). The Fool, at the centre
of the dance, stands in the place of God and functions as a Form of the
Good, just as the Stone and the Graal function similarly as Platonic
surrogates in their respective narratives. In a striking elaboration of the
Platonic model along specifically Christian lines, Williams indicates that
the creative power of God does not reside directly in the Fool, but in the
Juggler. "[Nancy] saw —but this more in her ow n m ind—the remote
figure of the Juggler, standing in the void before creation was, and
flinging up the glowing balls which came into being as they left his
hands, and became planets and stars [...]" (GT 140). It recalls the way in
which Christ, not the Father, is described as the one "through w hom all
things were made" (Jn 1.3). Like the Father and Son, the Fool and the
Juggler are a unity for they "came together; they embraced; the tossing
balls fell over them in a shower of gold [...]" (GT 103).
Nancy and Sybil, again like Chloe, both experience profound
epiphanies that they seek "for no personal gain, to satisfy no
transcendental curiosity, [...] but purely from an instinct of love"
(Underhill 85) through their contact w ith the figures, the cards, and the
great dance they enact. Sybil's observations are especially significant in
the larger metaphysical context:
[The figures of the dance] were the most beautiful things, with that
varying light irradiating and striking outward from each, and a kind
of gold aureole hanging in the air [...] She knew where the golden
light came from among the images; it came from the figure of the Fool
who moved so much the most swiftly, who seemed to be everywhere
at once, whose irradiation shone therefore so universally upward that
it maintained the circle of gold high over all, under which the many
other rays of colour mingled and were dominated now by one, now
by another. It had been, this afternoon, as if some figure—say, the
Fool himself—had come speeding down from his own splendid abode
of colour to her brother's side. She contemplated the idea; so, one
might imagine, only no imagination could compass it, so did the
beautiful perfection which was in and beyond all things make haste to
sustain its creatures in their mood; immediacy to immediacy. She
moved her foot lazily through the water of the bath, and half
pretended, half-believed, that little sparkles of gold rose and floated
off as she did so: then she abandoned the fancy hastily. (GT 135)
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Williams describes the figure of the Fool very m uch in the same way that
Chloe eventually comes to understand that everything is somehow in the
Stone "everywhere at once." This is coupled with an image of Platonic
emanation: the Fool "sustaining its creatures in their mood." Perhaps
most importantly, however, the whole experience is capped off by Sybil's
apprehension of universal meaning in the particular—here the
apparently insignificant movement of Sybil's foot becomes itself
profoundly im portant in the context of the dance of creation.
N or does the seemingly inscrutable nature of the Fool prevent
Sybil from putting her trust directly in him. W hen the rest of the
household becomes terrified by the violent storm Henry raises using the
cards, Sybil rebukes that terror saying, "Do you suppose that the storm
can ever touch the Fool?" (GT 139); and "[...] never m ind the storm; it's
nothing; it's under the feet of the Fool" (GT 140). Sybil is not frightened
because, like Chloe, she understands that there are "roads and rules"
that ensure an outcome metaphysically consistent with the goodness of
God: "I know the dance" (GT 139) she says. A nd dance, like liturgy, is
for those who understand it a form of ordered movement, a geometry,
that banishes all irrational fear (cf. "The Making of Taliessin" 182;
Witchcraft 78; Ridler xlvii). 15
It has already been commented that Augustine describes the
process of salvation as a movement along a continuum of being—echoed
by Williams in Lord Arglay's speculation that there may be degrees in
reality. Our final goal is to return to the "centre"—the perfection of our
being within the plenitude of God's ow n being. One of the most
compelling images Williams marshals of this concept is that of the Tarot's
Tower, ever falling and rising in The Greater Trumps. The Tower, in its
cyclical creation and collapse, hovers between being and nothingness
and becomes a symbol of hum an salvation along that continuum: like
Tumulty in Many Dimensions, whether rising or collapsing it always
participates to a greater or lesser extent in being and, therefore, in
goodness. Near the end of the novel Henry experiences a vision in
which he comes to share a single existence with the Tower and where its
continual rise and collapse becomes a metaphysical symbol of his own
salvation along the continuum of being:

Mythlore 93/94 Winter/Spring 2006

27

Hermeticism and the Metaphysics of Goodness in the Novels of Charles Williams

Very slowly the Tower had moved right up against him; he could see
it no more, for he was one with it. A quiver began at the bottom of his
spine, spreading through his loins, and then it ceased, and he felt
rigidity within h im —up, up, till he was petrified from loins to head,
himself a tower of stone. Even so, he m eant to do something, to lift a
great marble arm and reach u p and pick the stars from heaven and
table them into a crow n—a hard sharp golden crow n—for a head such
as Nimrod's, perhaps his own [...] just as he dreamed of the
prem onitory prick of the starry spikes upon his head, something
within him began to fall. He trembled with giddiness; he would have
swayed but could not. There ran a downward rippling through his
flesh; [...] he was dragged at from within every direction; he was on
the edge of being torn into destruction. Then again slowly he was
steadied, and again his long petrifaction proceeded, and so through
cycle after cycle of years [...] (GT 168)

Eventually, perfection is reached and the rising and falling cease: "For
there, between the two towers, the moon shines, clear and perfect, and
the towers are no longer Babels ever rising and falling, but complete in
their degree" (GT 195). Like Tumulty's remote awareness of the Stone,
this is an illustration of hell as privation and heaven as ontological
perfection. In this case, however, it is the more complex wavering of a
single individual along the continuum of being.
N ot surprisingly, Sybil finds herself not only at the centre of the
novel's metaphysical conclusion, but, like Chloe and Prester John, an
integral part of it. She is repeatedly identified as metaphysically
complete throughout the novel —as "enjoy[ing] everything" (GT 38),
"exist[ing] in herself" (GT 206), and in whom "[...] the delight of creation
answered the delight of the Creator" (GT 126). Indeed, it is she alone
who can see the movements of the Fool—so quick that they are invisible
to everyone else (GT 78). In the eventual consummation of the storm
raised by the Tarots, Nancy sees "Sybil standing in the m iddle of the hall
[and] the storm in its elemental shapes of w ind and water dancing about
her" (GT 222). As both the Graal and the Stone are at the "centre," so too
is Sybil's open hand at "the centre of all things, the power and the glory,
the palm glowing w ith a ruddy passion veiled by the aureate flesh" (GT
227). It is truly a transcendent moment of insight where a "foot stepping
from a train becomes the rock of all existence" (Witchcraft 78). And,
raising it to a theological pitch, just as Williams describes being flowing
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out from Chloe (MD 262) and uses the creation narrative as context for
Prester John's final Mass (WH 253), so in this moment, "[...] the hand of
the Juggler had been stretched to cast and catch the tossed balls of
existence; so the hand of the Fool had a last fulfilled the everlasting
promise and yielded its secrets to the expected hour" (GT 227).
The metaphysics of goodness—the goodness of mere being in
itself—is a theme that runs through all of Williams's work and forms the
whole basis of his theodicy: the goodness of the Creation, humanity's
contradiction of that goodness in the Fall, and its eventual reaffirmation
in the acts of the Incarnation and the Resurrection (He Came Down 58-9).
The Archdeacon's apotheosis, Chloe's ontological union w ith the Stone,
and the image of creation itself springing from the palm of Sybil's hand,
are progressively more potent illustrations of these metaphysical
principles. And although these events and images are prom pted by or
instantiated in hermetic objects, "The point is not where they came from
but what they have become" ("Malory and the Grail Legend" 187). As
central images of the metaphysics of goodness in each narrative, they
function as the common "starting-point" (Underhill 180) for both magic
and the mysticism —any distinction between the two is a "matter of
choice" (Witchcraft 78) in that it relies not on essence but on praxis. In
themselves they are good and "they remain as on the first day of
creation" (Chesterton 125).
Those who attempt to subvert their
metaphysical goodness through an illicit extension of will (cf. He Came
Down 21) engage in a sort of black magic. O n the other hand, those who
refuse to violate the natural metaphysical harm ony that exists between
themselves, the objects, and the wider universe, practice a transcendent
mysticism and experience subsequent moments of insight into the
interconnectedness, the Coinherence, of the cosmos and the goodness of
being in itself. In this way Williams moves beyond the hermetic images
to a deep affirmation of "faith in the nature of God, hope in the nature of
things in God" ("The Way of Affirmation" 155).
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Notes
1 In spite of the literary evidences, earlier critics (Anne Ridler is one notable exception)
have been generally anxious to downplay the depth of Waite's influence on Williams as
well as his ongoing interest in hermeticism. Alice Hadfield, for example, wrote of Waite's
Fellowship that Williams's "outlook and philosophy were not generated, or indeed much
affected, by it. He was thirty-one when he joined and his mind was already well-based,
developed, and directed" (30). Thomas Howard, writing at about the same time similarly
remarked, "Williams was not interested in the occult at all except during a brief period in
his early life" (9).
2 In 1923 Williams was "Invested as Master of the Temple and solemnly Installed" (Willard
273). By 1925 he had finished his first draft of The Black Bastard which was eventually
published in 1933, after heavy revision, as Shadows of Ecstasy; sometime in 1926 he finished
a second novel, The Corpse, which later became his first published novel in 1930 under the
title War in Heaven (Hadfield 81-2, 92). It is unlikely that Williams began writing his third
novel, Many Dimensions, until sometime after War in Heaven had been accepted for
publication in 1929 (Hadfield 96). Although he attended his last meeting of the Fellowship
after participating in the Ceremony of Consecration of the Threshold of Sacred Mystery in
June 1927 (Willard 273), Williams continued to turn to Waite's works for inspiration.
3 Other critics (Brewer 62-3, Willard 284) have identified the Stone in Many Dimensions with
the philosophers' stone described in Waite's Secret Tradition of Alchemy (1926). The Stone as
described by Hajji Ibrahim (MD 44), however, shares a significant number of attributes
with the "mysterious stone called Schethl'ya" (228) described by Waite in The Holy Kabbalah.
The Stone in Williams's novel, moreover, is a real physical object while the philosophers'
stone is more usually employed in the alchemical tradition as a metaphor for the process not
the object of transmutation.
4 The Place of the Lion (1931) is not considered because it does not offer a single hermetic
object as an image around which the text is built. In addition, although "the supernatural
element is prominent, magic does not play a part" (Brewer 63). Neither does Shadows of
Ecstasy (1933), written first and published as the last of these five, lend itself as readily to
this type of analysis because in place of a single hermetic object, Williams substitutes a
living man.
5 Plotinus is the first ancient philosopher overtly to propose an equivalency between being
and goodness (see Enneads 1.8). His work influenced Augustine and, through him, the
larger development of Christian metaphysics.
6 Exodus 3.14 is one of the most frequently cited verses in support of the metaphysical
equivalency of being and goodness. Augustine alone comments on it in fifty separate
passages (see Zum Brunn 102ff).
7 Whether or not Williams actually believed in the existence of the Devil is uncertain. There
is an interesting passage in The Greater Trumps where Sybil contemplates praying for the
redemption of Satan but at last refrains because "she [doesn't] believe in the Devil" (136).
In Witchcraft Williams describes Satan's fall from Heaven, both mythologically and in the
Resurrection, as a defeat of evil so thorough that "In the new state such things could not be,
and there was no such great need to make war on them" (36-7). But he adds, during the
persecutions, that "The Church, in fact, had begun to need an opponent whom it could
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divinely hate. It might spiritually oppose, but it certain was not allowed to hate, its
persecutors. The crosses went up; the torches flared; the wild beasts were loosed” (37). In
a similar vein Williams comments in He Came Down from Heaven: “The devil, even if he is a
fact, has been an indulgence” (18). See also Witchcraft 310-11.
8 Williams elsewhere suggests a relationship other than antithesis between magic and
religion. For example, he argues that the answer to Christ’s question “Who do you say I
am?” (Mk 8.29) was for Peter “a kind of incantation, the invocation of a ritual, antique, and
magical title” (He Came Down 51).
9 Scheper argues that in this scene the Archdeacon dies (144). If this is so his death seems
less an ending and more an apotheosis like that of Enoch (Gen 5.24) or Elijah (2 Kings 2.11).
See also “Malory and the Grail Legend” 193-4.
10 Although this apotheosis takes place in the context of the Mass, Williams’s subsequent
novels also show an ecclesial setting isn’t in itself necessary for an effective use of images to
illustrate Christian metaphysical abstractions. Neither Chloe’s nor Sibyl’s final epiphanies,
for example, take place within the context of a liturgy.
11 Williams comments on this divine unity with specific reference even to the Incarnation,
writing “even now, in spite of the Athanasian Creed, the single existence of the Incarnate
Word is too often almost Gnostically contemplated as an inhabitation of the flesh by the
Word. But it is not so; what He is, He is wholly and absolutely, and even in His death and
in the separation of body and soul He remains wholly and absolutely one” (“Natural
Goodness” 76).
12 The Latin terms are themselves translated borrowings from Plotinus’s Greek  and
  (see Enneads 6, 9, 11-13; Zum Brunn 58).
13 Williams makes his closest approach to complete annihilation in War in Heaven,
describing one character thus: “No mortal mind could conceive a desire which was not
based on a natural and right desire; even the hunger for death was but a perversion of the
death which precedes all holy birth. But of every conceivable and inconceivable desire this
was the negation. This was desire itself sick, but not unto death; rejection which tore all
things asunder and swept them with it in its fall through the abyss” (242).
14 Williams makes a clear distinction between the ontological goodness of a thing and its
potential evil uses. Sybil remarks of Aaron’s duplicity that “even if [Aaron’s] courtesy had
hidden some other intention […] still courtesy in itself was good and to be enjoyed: yes,
certainly good was not to be denied in itself because motives were a little mixed” (GT 156)
and, “The courtesy was one thing; the purpose of the courtesy was another thing; there
need be no confusion of substances” (GT 157). Boethius makes the same distinction
between being and praxis arguing that, while all things that exist are good, not all things
are just since “good has to do with essence […] but being just with an act” (De
Hebdomadibus I.164).
15 Scheper (146) argues that in All Hallows’ Eve magic is a parody of liturgy and the
magician a parody of Christ. This is consonant with the Christian tenet that evil has no
substance of its own and that, consequently, it can only be a corruption or parody of some
preexisting good. Though this approach works very well in All Hallows’ Eve it is perhaps
more difficult to see how objects such as the Graal and the Stone of Suleiman, in place of
agents like Simon the Clerk, can be, in themselves, parodies. Rather, these objects appear
metaphysically good in themselves though liable to misuse. Scheper acknowledges that
Williams’s final two novels focus exclusively on human interactions while his earlier
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narratives are constructed around "human interactions in relation to a symbolic artifact
such as the Grail, the Stone, the Tarot, or the Archetypes" (153).
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The Site:
•
Thurm an J. White Forum Building on the OU campus
Housing:
•
The Sooner Hotel & Suites (standard hotel rooms and two-bedroom cottage suites)
•
Breakfast, lunch, and dinner in the Commons Restaurant on-site
Events:
•
Book signing and reception at the University of Oklahoma m ain campus bookstore.
•
Annual Banquet in the Sam Noble Oklahoma M useum of N atural History.
Campus Amenities:
•
Special exhibit on Native American authors at the W estern History Collections
•
Special exhibit on m aps in the History of Science Collection in Bizzell Library
•
Maps and brochures are available for self-guiding walking tours of the campus, w ith a
focus on our wonderful sculptures, architecture, and gardens.
Transportation:
Fly into Will Rogers International Airport in Oklahoma City (about 45 minutes from
Norman) or the nearby hub airports at Dallas/Fort W orth (a three-hour drive b y rental car).

P le a se jo in u s in O k la h o m a in 2 0 0 6 -W e n ever m et a h o b b it w e d id n 't lik e!
For more information,
contact Janet Brennan Croft, 405-325-1918 or jbcroft@ou.edu
Go to www.mythsoc.org for registration details
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